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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

) Docket No. 39483-2011
Plaintiff/Respondent,) Case No. CR-2009 -0025609
v.

)
)
)
)

RICHARD W. WRIGHT,

Defendant!Appellant, )

APPELLANT'S REPL Y BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE PENNY FRIEDLANDER, Magistrate Judge
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge
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Lawrence G. Wasden
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f. Idaho Code § 49-102(3)
2. CASE LAW
a. Statutory Interpretation
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we
exercise free review." McLean v. Mavelik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho
810,813,135 P.3d 756,759 (2006). "This Court must construe a statute to
give effect to the intent of the legislature." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille
School Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655,658 (2006). "It must
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a
whole." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135
P.3d 756, 759 (2006) (citations omitted). "Statutes that are in pari materia
must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari
matelia if they relate to the same subject." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint
Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905,909 (2003)
(citations omitted)."
Paolini v. Alberston's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (Idaho 2006).
Where the legislature has not provided a definition, terms in a
statute are given their commonly understood, everyday meanings.
Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425,849 P.2d 98 (1993).
In construing a statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle
refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to
the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act
and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the
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provisions.
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88
(1990).
When interpreting a statute, the most important aim is to ascertain
the Legislature's intent when considering all the applicable statutes,
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy
behind the statute, and the legislative history.
State v. Pifia, 149 Idaho 140, 144,233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Richard W. Wright appeals his conviction following a bench trial of
a violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301. The thrust ofMr. Wright's appeal is that Idaho Code § 491301 does not apply to single vehicle collisions. Mr. Wright argues that to convict him of a
violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 the State must prove that a vehicle dri ven by Mr. Wright was
involved in a collision with another vehicle driven or attended by a person.
In Mr. Wright's case, there was a glancing collision between Mr. Wright's vehicle and a
speed limit sign when Mr. Wright's vehicle slid of an icy road as he drove to work one morning.
Construing the State's evidence most favorable to the prosecution, it would be concluded that the
collision damaged a piece of a plastic door strip on Mr. Wright's vehicle and that Mr. Wright's
vehicle was the only vehicle involved in the collision. It would also be concluded that the speed
limit sign was knocked down in the collision. No person was injured in the collision.
2. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The Brief of Respondent filed by the State in this matter does not directly argue the
points raised by the Appellant in his Opening Brief on Appeal, except to suggest that in the
interpretation of a statute, the words of the statute are to be given their plain meaning and to
suggest that the Supreme Court, on review, will not substitute its opinion of the facts for that of
the trier of fact and will construe all inferences in favor of upholding the verdict. The State seems
to rely on the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal as its argument in
this matter.
The State's posture necessarily focuses further argument on the issues addressed by the
District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal. It is important to note that
there was a primary issue raised before the District Court on intermediate appeal that has not
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been pursued in this appeal to the Supreme Court. That issue was that the Defendant/Appellant,
Richard W. Wright, had been denied the right to the assistance of counsel at his sentencing. That
issue is not pursued on appeal to the Supreme Court and a discussion of that issue permeates
throughout much of the District Court's decision below, which is relied upon by the State here.
The Appellant's argument to the Supreme Court on appeal is that he was wrongly
convicted of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 under the facts of the collision. Namely that he
did not remain at the scene of a single vehicle collision with a speed limit sign, nor report the
collision to law enforcement prior to the time that law enforcement called him the morning of the
collision.
The Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge that he violated Idaho Code § 49-1301
and he requested a trial to the court, rather than a trial by jury. The significance of that fact is that
this Defendant was not required to object to jury instructions regarding Idaho Code § 49-1301 to
preserve his position on appeal. There was no jury.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal, the District Court concluded that
because the Defendant had failed to argue to the trial court that Idaho Code § 49-1301 did not
apply to the facts of his case, that he had waived that argument on appeal. The District Court
then discussed why, in the District Court's opinion, the trial court's conviction of the Defendant
of violating Idaho Code § 49-1301 did not rise to the level of fundamental error, which is
essentially error so profound that it produces manifest injustice and cuts to the core of the
conviction and which would be reviewed on appeal even if not raised below.
The District Court expressed its legal conclusion in this manner:
This Court concludes Wright failed to raise the issue of insufficient
evidence at trial to support a conviction under Idaho Code § 491301, and accordingly, Wright has waived his right to hear that
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issue on appeal."
(R., pp. 83-101, Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal, p. 6). It is clear from the briefing
before the District Court on intermediate appeal that Mr. Wright raised precisely those issues
before the District Court and so the District Court must be either mistaken in that regard, or be
referring to the fact that Mr. Wright did not raise the issue of the applicability of Idaho Code §
49-1301 at trial. From the District Court's discussion of the issue in its Memorandum Decision
and Order on Appeal, the asserted failure to raise the issue at trial seems to be the focus of the
District Court's opinion.
The trial in this case was a trial to the court. There were no jury instructions to be
objected to. It was incumbent on the trial court to correctly apply the applicable law to the facts
which it found to be true, regardless of input from the Defendant. If the law does not support the
conviction of the Defendant under the facts as found by the trial court, the conviction should be
vacated.
The thrust of this appeal is exactly that urged by the Appellant to the District Court
below; because Idaho Code § 49-1301 does not apply to a collision between a single vehicle and
a speed limit sign, the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Wright was guilty of a violation of that
statute. The Defendant is not arguing on appeal that the statute is unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad, rather he is arguing as a matter of law that Idaho Code § 49-1301 applies only to
collisions between a defendant's vehicle and another vehicle driven or attended by any person.
Mr. Wright's argument continues that because the State failed to prove at trial the
involvement of a second vehicle in the collision, the State failed to prove an essential element of
a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 and thus, the trial court erred when it convicted Mr. Wright
of that offense.
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Because the State seems to defer to the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order on Appeal as its argument on appeal, it is necessary to address the District Court's overall
analysis.
This Court has previously discussed some additional relevant standards which apply to
the process of construing a statute beyond those discussed by the parties in their briefing to this
point. Those standards include the following:
Where the legislature has not provided a definition, terms in a
statute are given their commonly understood, everyday meanings.
Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 849 P.2d 98 (1993).
In construing a statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle
refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to
the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act
and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the
provisions.
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d l385, l387-88
(1990).
When interpreting a statute, the most important aim is to ascertain
the Legislature's intent when considering all the applicable statutes,
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy
behind the statute, and the legislative history.
State v. Pifia, 149 Idaho 140, 144,233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010).
The involvement of a speed limit sign in this accident is entirely irrelevant to whether or
not the Defendant could have violated Idaho Code § 49-l301.
Because Idaho Code § 49-l301 clearly applies only to collisions causing damage to
vehicles, the street sign is relevant only as the modality by which Mr. Wright's vehicle was
damaged. The street sign could have been a rock, or a tree, or a bird, or a deer, or any other nonvehicle mechanism causing collision damage to Mr. Wright's vehicle.
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The real issue is whether or not Idaho Code § 49-1301, when read together with the
extraordinarily broad definition of the term "accident" contained in Idaho Code § 49-102(3),
requires that a driver stop and remain at the scene of any event causing unintentional damage
only to their own vehicle.
The cases from other jUlisdictions cited by the Appellant in his Opening Brief on Appeal
make clear that in those jurisdictions there is no duty to remain at the scene of a single vehicle
accident involving only the driver's own vehicle, under statutes of those states using
substantially identical language to that ofIdaho Code § 49-1301.
Depending on the extent of damage to one's own vehicle, or resulting injury to a person,
there may be a duty to immediately report the accident to law enforcement as required by Idaho
Code § 49-1305, but otherwise no duty to remain at the scene of a single vehicle collision.
For a single vehicle accident, especially an not required to be immediately reported to law
enforcement under I.e. § 49-1305, and especially a single vehicle collision with a cliff, or a rock
or a tree limb, or a deer, what could be the point? As in Mr. Wright's case, there is simply no
other person at the scene with whom to share identification and insurance information. It seems
very likely that it would be exactly those types of situations which compelled this Court in the
case of Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108, Ill, 58 P.3d 92,95 (Idaho
2002) to muse:
"In the case before us, where the property damage caused by the
accident was to the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a runaway
horse, the applicability of the statute [I.e. § 49-1301] is not
obvious." [Brackets Added]
Munns, supra. 138 Idaho at 111.
The rules regarding statutory construction clearly suggest that it is improper to overlook
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any operative word of a statute when construing that statute. Idaho Code § 49-1301 contains the
operative word 'only' in a very important location. That statute reads in the relevant portion:
§ 49-1301. ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE

(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or private
property open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven
or attended by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident, or as close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every
event shall remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the
requirements of law.
Idaho Code § 49-1301(1). The phrase "resulting only in damage to a vehicle driven or
attended by any person" is a phrase that is clearly intended by the Legislature to limit the
application of the punishment sections of that statute, and not to expand them. It is only in cases
where an attended vehicle strikes and damages another attended vehicle that the one (1) year
license suspension required by Idaho Code § 49-1301(4) applies. Such an interpretation is the
only interpretation consistent with the clear language of Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1306,
the instruction approved and provided for use in cases where a violation of Idaho Code § 491301 is alleged. That Instruction expressly requires proof by the state of the involvement of
"another vehicle" as an essential element of the offense of violating Idaho Code § 49-1301.
In order to convict Mr. Wright of a violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301, it was necessary
for the State to prove the involvement of a second attended vehicle in the collision. Because the
State's evidence actually excluded the involvement of a second vehicle, that evidence did not
support the trial court's conviction of the Appellant of violating Idaho Code § 49-1301 and the
judgment should have been entered for an acquittal and that is the simple thrust of this
Appellant's appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the conviction of the Defendant, Richard W. Wright, for a
violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 should be vacated, which will also restore to Mr. Wright the
first use of the withheld judgment granted to him by the trial court in this case in the unlikely
event he should be found in violation of a criminal statute in the future, and restore to him the
$200.00 penalty which he has paid in this case.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 28-fday of September 2012.
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Richard W. Wright
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2ffl1.. day of September 2012 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, addressed to
the following:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Jessica M. Lorello
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
b4--U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.
[ ] Fax transmission
[ ] Hand delivered.
[ ] Other
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC

Richard K.YllCk~--
Attorney for Defendant!Appellant
Richard W. Wright
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